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“Can you hear me now?” is the hallmark slogan for Verizon Wireless services. The popular 
Verizon commercial highlights Paul Marcarelli, an actor hired by Verizon, saying the slogan in 
various settings with his cellphone in his hand.2 This Verizon slogan has one purpose: to 
communicate to potential (and existing) Verizon customers that its cellular phone coverage was 
superior to its competitors, resulting in Verizon’s customers being able to clearly hear what was 
being said to them. The importance of being heard and, more significantly, understood by others, 
 
 Aaron Loudenslager, Staff Attorney, Dane County Circuit Court, March 2019-Present; Law Clerk to Judge Mark A. 
Seidl, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2016-2017; Law Clerk, Sauk County Circuit Court, 2015-2016; J.D., University 
of Wisconsin Law School, 2015; B.S., Northern Michigan University, 2012. The views expressed herein are solely 
those of the author. 
1 PINK FLOYD, Comfortably Numb, on THE WALL (Columbia Records 1979).  
2 See jwyoung5, Verizon Wireless “Test Man Launch,” 0:14-0:17, YOUTUBE (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPwPo-IAQ-E.  
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is not limited to the context of communication via cellular or other electronic devices. Another 
context in which it is imperative that people are clearly understood by others is when criminal 
defendants invoke their Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 
The legal question of whether a criminal defendant has clearly communicated his or her 
intention to forgo legal representation and instead choose self-representation is not easily 
distinguished when the Sixth Amendment is actually applied.3 Numerous cases from across the 
country demonstrate that although the Sixth Amendment question facially appears to be 
straightforward, in actuality the analysis is rarely that simple. 
This Essay explores the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Faretta v. 
California4  from various aspects in addition to providing an analysis of recent Faretta 
jurisprudence, including State v. Egerson,5 a recent Wisconsin appellate case addressing what 
constitutes a clear and unequivocal invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation 
in a criminal prosecution. First, this Essay recounts the right to self-representation enunciated in 
Faretta. Second, this Essay describes how lower courts initially struggled to clearly articulate the 
contours of the right to self-representation. Third, this Essay highlights the Court’s attempts to 
provide some additional guidance regarding the right to self-representation. Fourth, this Essay 
examines Wisconsin’s most recent Faretta jurisprudence in Egerson. Finally, this Essay analyzes 
whether the defendant in Egerson has plausible grounds for successfully obtaining a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court.     
 
3 For instance, there is a split in judicial authority on the fundamental, threshold question of whether the determination 
of whether a defendant has clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation is a question of fact or, 
rather, a question of law. Compare, e.g., Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1032 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (question of 
fact), with State v. Flanagan, 978 A.2d 64, 75 n.10 (Conn. 2009) (question of law).    
4 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
5 2018 WI App 49, 383 Wis. 2d 718, 916 N.W.2d 833, review denied, 2018 WI __. 
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In short, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve inconsistencies and 
unanswered questions in its Faretta jurisprudence, and also to ensure that defendants’ clear 
invocation of their constitutional right to self-representation in a criminal prosecution is 
scrupulously honored by trial courts. However, as a result of the decision to deny Egerson’s 
petition for review, Wisconsin’s Faretta jurisprudence remains logically fragmented. The 
fragmentation increases the likelihood of more fallacious reasoning in the future. Even so, the 
defendant in Egerson has plausible grounds for obtaining habeas relief in federal court, however, 
the viability of those federal claims is outside the scope of this Essay.  
I. FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA: AN ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IS IMPLICIT 
IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
 
 More than forty years ago in its landmark decision Faretta v. California,6 the United States 
Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, an accused person has a constitutional right 
to self-representation in a criminal prosecution.7 The Court’s decision rested on the text, structure, 
and history of the Sixth Amendment.8 Although the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment 
embodies the right to self-representation, the Court also noted that this right is not absolute in 
 
6 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
7 Although Faretta was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s constitutional 
right to self-representation in a criminal prosecution, see id. at 814-17, the Court’s prior cases had: (1) indicated a 
defendant could waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel with the permission of a trial court and (2) strongly 
suggested the Sixth Amendment provided a defendant with an independent right to self-representation in a criminal 
prosecution, see Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“The absence of [a defendant’s right to personally argue 
his case on appeal] is in sharp contrast to his constitutional prerogative of being present in person at each significant 
stage of a felony prosecution and to his recognized privilege of conducting his own defense at the trial.” (citations 
omitted) (footnote omitted)); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (concluding that “an 
accused, in the exercise of free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial 
by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel”). 
8 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-31; see also John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: 
An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 
494 (1996) (“The [Faretta] decision centered on a discussion of the language, logic, and history of the Sixth 
Amendment.”). 
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nature and, in appropriate circumstances, could be curtailed by a trial court.9 In addition, when a 
defendant decides to forgo representation by counsel and proceed alone (meaning, as a factual 
matter, the defendant gives up “many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to 
counsel”10), the Court noted the defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish” the defendant’s decision “is 
made with eyes open.”11  The Court’s opinion also suggested, but did not necessarily require, that 
a defendant’s request for self-representation be clear and unequivocal.12 
 Justice Harry Blackman noted in his dissent that the Court’s decision left many potential 
practical questions surrounding an accused’s right to self-representation unanswered.13 As one 
commentator noted:  
The Justice’s concerns included whether every defendant must be advised of the 
right to self-representation, how waiver should be measured, whether there existed 
a right to standby counsel, whether a defendant may switch mid-trial, how soon in 
the proceeding must a defendant decide to proceed pro se, whether a violation of 
the right to self-representation could ever constitute harmless error, and how a trial 
court is to treat a pro se defendant.14 
 
 
9 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (noting that “[t]he right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity 
of the courtroom” and concluding that a “trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately 
engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct”). 
10 Id. at 835. 
11 Id. (citation omitted) (quotation mark omitted). 
12 See id. at 835-36 (observing that “weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge 
that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel” and holding that “[i]n forcing Faretta, under these 
circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the California courts deprived him of his 
constitutional right to conduct his own defense”); accord State v. Darby, 2009 WI App 50, ¶ 18, 317 Wis. 2d 478, 766 
N.W.2d 770 (“[A]lthough the Court in Faretta approved a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se as triggering 
the trial court’s obligation to insure a valid waiver of the right to counsel and competency to proceed pro se, the Court 
did not expressly hold that only a clear and unequivocal declaration of the desire to proceed pro se triggers these trial 
court obligations.”). Nonetheless, lower courts appear to have uniformly concluded that a defendant’s invocation of 
the right to self-representation needs to be unambiguous. See Darby, 2009 WI App 50, ¶ 19 (collecting cases); cf. 
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71, (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“If a 
request is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive 
a right to counsel. If the request is clear, however, a Faretta hearing must follow, to assure that the defendant is not 
required to proceed with the unwanted assistance of counsel.”). 
13 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackman, J., dissenting). 
14 Decker, supra note 8, at 498 (footnote omitted). 
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Justice Blackman predicted that many of these unanswered questions would be difficult for trial 
courts to answer because of the lack of guidance provided by the Court,15 suggesting future 
inconsistent application of Faretta among the lower courts.   
 
II. POST-FARETTA: LOWER COURTS STRUGGLE TO DEMARCATE THE CONTOURS OF AN 
ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 
 
 Twenty years after Faretta, a survey of lower court decisions demonstrated that Justice 
Blackman’s concerns were well-founded.16 As Justice Blackman predicted, lower courts initially 
struggled to demarcate the contours of an accused’s right to self-representation in criminal 
prosecutions.  
For instance, lower courts initially split on the issue of whether a defendant’s constitutional 
right to self-representation extends to a first appeal.17 The lower courts also widely diverged on 
the issue of the appropriate standard of competency to apply to a defendant’s waiver of counsel.18 
Other issues the lower courts diverged on include: (1) whether it is a question or law or a question 
of fact when determining whether a defendant has clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to 
self-representation19 and (2) the significance of a trial court’s failure to conduct a formal inquiry 
 
15 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (predicting “procedural problems” would occupy “trial 
courts in the future” and opining that “[t]he procedural problems spawned by an absolute right to self-representation 
will far outweigh whatever tactical advantage the defendant may feel he has gained by electing to represent himself”). 
16 See Decker, supra note 8, at 498 (“A review of lower court case law, which follows, will demonstrate that for the 
past twenty years, the criminal justice system has struggled to mend the procedural holes left by the Faretta 
decision.”). 
17 Compare, e.g., United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to 
self-representation does not extend to first appeal), with Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) 
(“We hold here that the right of an accused to reject the services of counsel and instead represent himself extends 
beyond trial into the appellate process.”). 
18 Compare, e.g., United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the standard of competence 
required to stand trial is identical to the standard of competence required to waive counsel), with United States ex rel. 
Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that “the standard of competence for making the 
decision to represent oneself is vaguely higher than the standard for competence to stand trial”). 
19 See, e.g., State v. Towle, 35 A.3d 490, 502 (N.H. 2011) (Dalianis, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the determination 
of whether a defendant has clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation “is a question of fact,” 
but citing split of judicial authority with regard to that assertion). 
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on the record, after a defendant’s clear invocation of the right to self-representation, to ensure that 
the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently made.20 Unfortunately, 
courts continue to struggle with this task. 
 
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT PROVIDES LOWER COURTS WITH MORE GUIDANCE? 
 
Although lower courts struggled with defining the boundaries of the Sixth Amendment 
right to self-representation over the decades since Faretta, the United States Supreme Court has 
provided some guidance in subsequent cases. For example, in Godinez v. Moran,21 the Court 
determined the standard of competence required to waive the right to counsel is the same as the 
standard of competence required to stand trial.22 However, more than two decades later in Indiana 
v. Edwards,23 the Court appeared to backtrack and distinguished Godinez, holding “the 
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to 
stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not 
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”24 Additionally, in Martinez v. Court of 
 
20 See, e.g., Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari) (“If a request is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of 
a desire to waive a right to counsel. If the request is clear, however, a Faretta hearing must follow, to assure that the 
defendant is not required to proceed with the unwanted assistance of counsel.”); Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld & Shri 
Klintworth, Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: III. Trial: Right to 
Counsel, 89 GEO. L.J. 1485, 1493-94 (2001) (stating that “the trial judge’s failure to hold a waiver hearing, however, 
may not be sufficient error to warrant reversal, particularly if the trial record otherwise demonstrates a knowing and 
intelligent waiver”); Frederic Paul Gallun, Note, The Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on the Right 
to Waive Counsel Under Faretta, 23 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 559, 601 n.63 (1997) (noting “seven circuits follow 
the ‘record as a whole approach,’ and five circuits follow the ‘formal inquiry approach’”). 
21 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
22 See id. at 396-99; see also Decker, supra note 8, at 518 (“In Godinez, the Court ruled that the competency standard 
used to determine a defendant’s ability to waive the right to counsel is no higher than that used to determine a 
defendant’s ability to stand trial.” (footnote omitted)). 
23 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
24 Id. at 178. 
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Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District,25 the Court held there is no “constitutional right 
to self-representation on direct appeal of a criminal conviction.”26 
Even though later cases provided lower courts with some much-needed guidance in the 
legal vacuum created by Faretta, the Court has left many other important questions surrounding 
the right to self-representation unanswered. It is these unanswered questions, at least in part, that 
explain the recent murkiness of Wisconsin’s Faretta jurisprudence.27 
 
IV. WISCONSIN’S EARLY SELF-REPRESENTATION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Faretta, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held a defendant has a right to self-representation in a criminal prosecution under 
the Wisconsin Constitution.28 But given the development of the right to court-appointed counsel 
for indigent defendants in the Sixth Amendment context, the Wisconsin Supreme Court later 
clarified in Laster v. State29 that an indigent defendant does not have a right to unilaterally forgo 
court-appointed counsel.30 Rather, a defendant may forgo court-appointed counsel and proceed 
 
25 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
26 Id. at 163; see also id. at 165-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Since a State could, as far as the Federal 
Constitution is concerned, subject its trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them 
to review which consists of a nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts. 
Adversarial review with counsel appointed by the State is even less questionable than that.”). 
27 In addition to the unanswered questions raised by Faretta that were previously mentioned in this Essay, see supra 
notes 19-20 and accompanying text, other unanswered questions include what constitutes a timely invocation of the 
constitutional right to self-representation, compare Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
“a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is empaneled”), with Russell v. State, 383 N.E.2d 309, 
314 (Ind. 1978) (noting the disagreement among courts “about how the timeliness requisite is to be phrased and 
applied” and concluding “ that the right of self-representation must be asserted within a reasonable time prior to the 
day on which the trial begins”).   
28 See Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 509-11b, 129 N. W. 2d 175 (1964); Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 479, 136 
N.W. 166 (1912). 
29 60 Wis. 2d 525, 211 N.W.2d 13 (1973). 
30 See id. at 539 (stating that a defendant “does not have the right, however, to individually dispense with court-
appointed counsel”). 
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alone only once the trial court has determined that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently 
waived the right to counsel.31 
 After Faretta, Wisconsin appellate courts, similar to other lower courts, struggled to 
develop answers to the many explicit and implicit questions raised by the Court’s decision. For 
instance, in Pickens v. State,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue of what 
constitutes a valid waiver of the right to counsel.33 The state supreme court admonished trial courts 
“to conduct a thorough and comprehensive examination of the defendant” to ensure that a 
defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made.34 This admonishment was 
consistent with Faretta’s admonition that a defendant who requests self-representation be made 
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.35  
However, the court ultimately concluded “it is the accused’s apprehension, not the trial 
court’s examination, that determines whether the waiver is valid. If the defendant’s understanding 
of the necessary facts appears in the record other than in response to specific questions put to him 
by the trial court, a knowing waiver can be found.”36 
 More than fifteen years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court changed course. In State v. 
Klessig,37 the court overruled Pickens and mandated “the use of a colloquy in every case where a 
defendant seeks to proceed pro se,”38 a colloquy that addressed the four specific factors articulated 
 
31 See State v. Johnson, 50 Wis. 2d 280, 283-84, 184 N.W.2d 107 (1971) (noting that “[w]hether the request of either 
defendant or appointed counsel for termination of services is to be granted is directed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court” and concluding that waiver of appointed counsel “must be intelligently, voluntarily and understandingly 
made”). 
32 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980). 
33 See id. at 563-64. 
34 Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 564. 
35 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
36 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
37 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997). 
38 Id. at 206 (citing Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 563-64). 
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by the court in Pickens.39 In contrast to Pickens, Klessig precluded reviewing courts from 
concluding, based on the record alone and without the required colloquy, that a defendant’s waiver 
of counsel was valid.40 Instead, when a trial court fails to conduct the required colloquy and a 
defendant seeks to vacate a conviction on the basis that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not 
knowingly and intelligently made, “the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing on whether 
the waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”41 Klessig’s procedural 
framework remained settled for more than a decade, which provided parties with a degree of 
predictability and consistency.  
 
V. WISCONSIN’S RECENT FARETTA JURISPRUDENCE—LOSING SIGHT OF DEFENDANT 
AUTONOMY? 
 
A.  The Curious Case of Rashaad Imani 
 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court changed legal direction again in State v. Imani,42 while not 
explicitly overruling Klessig.43 In effect, the Wisconsin Supreme Court significantly modified a 
circuit court’s duty to conduct a colloquy when a defendant invokes the constitutional right to self-
representation.44 Whereas Klessig required a circuit court to conduct a discussion addressing the 
four factors enunciated in Pickens once a defendant invokes the right to self-representation,45 
 
39 The four factors under Pickens that a circuit court must address to ensure that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is 
valid are that the defendant: “(1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was aware of the difficulties 
and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of the charge or charges against him [or 
her], and (4) was aware of the general range of penalties that could have been imposed on him [or her].” Id. (citing 
Pickens, 96 Wis. 2d at 563-64).   
40 See id. 
41 Id. at 207. 
42 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40. 
43 See id. ¶ 34 (“Today we uphold Klessig as the controlling authority for determining whether a defendant validly 
waived the right to counsel and the preferred method for a circuit court to engage in such a colloquy.”). 
44 See id. ¶ 48 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the majority’s reformulation 
effectively overrules the clear, useful bright-line rule in Klessig requiring circuit courts to conduct a full and complete 
colloquy with all defendants seeking to waive assistance of counsel”). 
45 See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206 (citing Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 563-64, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980)). 
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Imani does not require a court to address all four Pickens factors, so long as the defendant fails to 
satisfy a single Pickens factor.46  
In Imani, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the circuit court engaged the defendant, 
Rashaad Imani, on two of the Pickens factors, and that the record reflected that Imani did not 
satisfy either of those two factors.47 Specifically, the state supreme court held that Imani “did not 
make a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel” and “was unaware of the difficulties and 
disadvantages of self-representation.”48 The court relied on the circuit court’s characterization of 
Imani’s request to represent himself as “flippant,” “short term,” “immature,” “episodic driven,” 
and “disgruntled” to determine that Imani did not make a “deliberate” choice to proceed alone.49 
By relying on Imani’s purported emotional state (e.g., anger and frustration) when he requested to 
represent himself to conclude that his request was not a “deliberate” one, the state supreme court 
 
46 See State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶¶ 33, 35 (admonishing circuit courts to engage in the full colloquy when a defendant 
invokes the right to self-representation, but holding that “if any one of the four conditions is not met, the circuit court 
is required to conclude that the defendant did not validly waive the right to counsel”). 
47 See id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 32. 
48 Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. 
49 Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
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appeared to import a legal principle from other jurisdictions sub silentio,50 a principle never 
explicitly adopted or utilized by Wisconsin courts before Imani.51 
Not only did the Wisconsin Supreme Court hold that Imani failed to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel, it also concluded “that the circuit court’s 
determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se [was] supported by the facts in the 
 
50 One of the seminal cases regarding the import of a defendant’s emotional state—especially anger or frustration—
when invoking the constitutional right to self-representation originates from California. See People v. Marshall, 931 
P.2d 262, 271-73 (Cal. 1997) (noting that if a defendant’s request for self-representation is “made in passing anger or 
frustration” it may be denied by a trial court as equivocal). However, Marshall is better understood as applying 
Faretta’s intimation that a defendant is not permitted—when purportedly invoking the constitutional right to self-
representation—to abuse the dignity of the judicial system by manipulating the judicial process with obstreperous 
conduct. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (noting that “[t]he right of self-representation is not 
a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom” and concluding that a “trial judge may terminate self-representation 
by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct”); accord Marshall, 931 P.2d at 
268, 274 (noting how the trial court expressed concern that the “defendant was attempting to manipulate the court by 
seeking self-representation in order to secure the dismissal of the public defender's office, and then giving up pro se 
status in order to have a certain attorney appointed” and holding that the trial court later properly denied the 
defendant’s purported request to represent himself because the request “was made to delay and disrupt the 
proceedings”); cf. Marc C. McAllister, Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing and Faretta: Reaffirming Counsel’s Vital Role 
When Defendants Manipulate Competing Sixth Amendment Representation Rights, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1227, 1245 
(2016) (noting that several “federal circuit courts have determined that a defendant’s obstructionist or dilatory conduct 
should result in [forfeiture] of the right to self-representation”). Nonetheless, before and after Marshall was decided, 
other courts have likewise concluded that a defendant’s emotional state when invoking the right to self-representation 
may render the defendant’s request ambiguous—or even insincere. See, e.g., Love v. Raemisch, 620 Fed. Appx. 642, 
648 (10th Cir. 2015) (upholding state court’s determination on habeas review that defendant’s request to proceed 
without counsel was ambiguous because it was “an impulsive act borne of frustration”); United States v. Frazier-El, 
204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant’s request to proceed alone, after expressing dissatisfaction 
with counsel’s refusal to present frivolous arguments to the trial court, was not “a sincere desire to dispense with the 
benefits of counsel”); Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant’s request to 
proceed alone was equivocal because it was an “impulsive response to the trial court’s denial of his request for new 
counsel” and that “a reasonable person could have concluded that [the defendant] was merely expressing his frustration 
and not clearly invoking his right to self-representation”); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that defendant’s request to proceed without counsel was ambiguous because it was an “emotional” and 
“impulsive” response to the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s prior motion to substitute counsel); People v. Hacker, 
563 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that defendant’s request to proceed pro se was equivocal 
because “it was a spur of the moment decision, prompted more by defendant’s dissatisfaction with the denial of his 
request to change assigned counsel”).  
51 One Wisconsin case could be construed as implying a defendant’s emotional state is relevant to the determination 
of whether a defendant has invoked the constitutional right to self-representation. See Laster v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 525, 
539, 211 N.W.2d 13 (1973) (concluding that defendant’s “outburst” was not invocation of constitutional right to self-
representation). However, Laster is better understood as being consistent with the now well-established rule that a 
defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with counsel, without more, is not an invocation of the right to self-
representation. See State v. Darby, 2009 WI App 50, ¶¶ 21, 26, 317 Wis. 2d 478, 766 N.W.2d 770 (collecting cases 
regarding the import of a defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel); accord Laster, 60 Wis. 2d at 539 (concluding that 
defendant’s “outburst” of being “railroaded” by his counsel was not invocation of the right to self-representation). 
11
Loudenslager: "Can You Hear Me Now"
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2020
 
 
record.”52 Although the court noted “a defendant’s ‘timely and proper request’ should be denied 
only where the circuit court can identify a specific problem or disability that may prevent the 
defendant from providing a meaningful defense,”53 it did not identify Imani as having a specific 
problem or disability in this regard. Instead, the court explained Imani “possessed only a tenth 
grade education,” had “observational” experience with the criminal justice system, and “asserted, 
without more, that he read at a college level.”54 In affirming the circuit court’s determination that 
Imani was not competent to proceed without counsel, the state supreme court illustrated the 
deferential nature of the court’s review on the issue; the circuit court’s determination regarding 
Imani’s competency was not “totally unsupported” by the court record.55  
 Justice Patrick Crooks authored an incisive partial dissent, criticizing the majority opinion 
for a variety of reasons.56 First, he noted the significant fact that neither party briefed the issue 
addressed by the majority opinion. The parties limited their argument to whether, as result of the 
circuit court not providing the required colloquy, Imani was entitled to a new trial or, rather, a 
retrospective evidentiary hearing as a remedy. The majority opinion addressed the broader issue 
 
52 Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶ 3. 
53 Id. ¶ 37 (quoting Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 568, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980)).  
54 Id. ¶ 38. 
55 See id. ¶¶ 37-38.  
56 Justice Patrick Crooks’ opinion was a partial dissent because he agreed “with the majority’s holding to the extent 
that it reverses the court of appeals’ remand for a new trial” but “strongly disagree with the majority’s failure to 
remand for a retrospective evidentiary hearing.” Id. ¶ 44 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
However, the state court of appeals was correct in concluding that the appropriate remedy was a new trial. Klessig 
envisions a situation in which a defendant seeks self-representation, the circuit court fails to conduct a full colloquy, 
but nevertheless permits the defendant to represent himself or herself. See State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206-07, 
564 N.W.2d 716 (1997). A retrospective evidentiary hearing under Klessig addresses—not whether the right to self-
representation was violated—but rather, whether the right to counsel was violated. See id. at 207. In Imani, the circuit 
court failed to conduct a full colloquy after the defendant sought self-representation, and then refused to permit the 
defendant to represent himself. See Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶ 25 (“The case before us, however, is the converse scenario 
of Klessig. Unlike Klessig, Imani did not proceed to trial without counsel.”). By failing to conduct a full colloquy once 
Imani invoked his right to self-representation, coupled with not permitting him to represent himself, the circuit court 
violated his right to self-representation—which entitled him to a new trial. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 
177 n.8 (1984) (concluding violation of the right to self-representation is not subject to harmless error analysis); United 
States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 523 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nce a defendant has stated his request clearly and unequivocally 
and the judge has denied it in an equally clear and unequivocal fashion, the defendant is under no obligation to renew 
the motion.”). 
12




of whether Imani’s constitutional right to self-representation was violated in the first place.57 As a 
result, the majority opinion’s legal analysis regarding the constitutional right to self-representation 
was conducted in a vacuum devoid of adversarial argumentation. Adversarial argumentation being 
one of the fundamental norms underlying the American legal system.58 In addition, by addressing 
a broader legal issue than the one raised by the parties, the state supreme court also appeared to 
contravene the judicial norm that cases should generally be decided on the narrowest grounds 
possible.59 
 Second, Justice Crooks argued that “the majority’s view that a partial colloquy could be 
sufficient essentially overrules Klessig and fails to serve the purposes advanced by a full and 
complete colloquy.”60 He noted “Klessig sets a bright-line rule requiring a full and complete 
colloquy touching upon the four Pickens factors when an accused requests self-representation” and 
argued that “a partial colloquy eliminates helpful guidance for circuit courts from Klessig and the 
 
57 See Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶¶ 41-48 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addressing a broader 
legal issue than the one initially raised by the parties, the state supreme court’s decision in Imani is similar to some 
notable United States Supreme Court’s decisions. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for deciding the “case on a basis relinquished below, 
not included in the questions presented to [the Court] by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s 
invitation”). 
58 See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 
(2011) (“The United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is a defining and distinctive feature of its 
legal system.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is 
best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”); Maurin v. Hall, 
2004 WI 100, ¶ 120 n.1, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“‘The fundamental premise 
of the adversary process is that these advocates will uncover and present more useful information and arguments to 
the decision maker than would be developed by a judicial officer acting on his [or her] own in an inquisitorial system.’” 
(quoting Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate 
Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 247 (2002)). 
59 See Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶ 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (“Typically, an appellate 
court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.” (citation omitted)); Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 
300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (noting that only dispositive issues need be addressed); cf. Society Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 
68, ¶27 n.8, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 (“A ‘facial challenge should generally not be entertained when an ‘as-
applied’ challenge could resolve the case.’” (quoting Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 
604, 624 (1996))).   
60 Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶ 58 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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[Wisconsin Jury Instructions], and is likely to bog down post-conviction and appellate review of 
such cases.”61 
 Third, Justice Crooks observed how the majority opinion at times appeared “to sidestep the 
fact that the circuit court failed to engage in the full and complete colloquy as mandated [under] 
Klessig” by “shift[ing] the responsibility to the defendant to present evidence supporting the four 
Pickens factors as well as showing his competence.”62 He emphasized both Klessig and the 
Wisconsin Jury Instructions indicate it is the circuit court’s duty, not the defendant’s duty, to 
ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is valid.63  
 Finally, Justice Crooks argued to the extent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court could 
determine from the record whether Imani’s waiver of counsel was valid, the record did not support 
the circuit court’s conclusion that Imani’s waiver of counsel was invalid.64 Justice Cooks thought 
the majority opinion seemed to ignore in its analysis the significant statements65 made by Imani to 
the circuit court.  Instead, the majority focused on “the circuit court’s language opining, without 
the full and complete colloquy, that Imani’s decision to represent himself was not deliberate 
because his decision was ‘immature,’ ‘flippant,’ and ‘episodic driven.’”66  
In contrast, Justice Crooks argued, even if Imani’s decision to represent himself was the 
result of anger or frustration, “it is not necessarily a non-deliberate choice.”67 In his view, the 
circuit court merely believed “that Imani was making a foolish choice by waiving counsel.”68 
 
61 Id. (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62 Id. ¶¶ 60, 67 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
63 See id. ¶ 61 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
64 See id. ¶ 68 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
65 For instance, after invoking his constitutional right to self-representation, Imani said to the circuit court, “[W]hen it 
comes to trial I know, like I said before, ain’t nobody going to represent myself better than me.” Id. ¶ 8 (majority 
opinion). 
66 Id. ¶ 69 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
67 Id. ¶ 70 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
68 Id. (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Justice Crooks also suggested that the majority opinion’s conclusion that the court record 
supported a determination that Imani was not competent to represent himself was inconsistent with 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta and the state supreme court’s decision in 
Pickens.69 
 In Imani v. Pollard,70 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed 
whether Imani was, as a result of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, entitled to a writ of 
habeas corpus.71 A petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court when a 
state court decision on the petitioner’s claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”72 A state court decision contravenes clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal 
conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court or reaches a 
different conclusion than that Court based on materially indistinguishable facts.73 Additionally, a 
state court decision unreasonably applies clearly established precedent if it identifies the correct 
governing legal principle, but nevertheless unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 
case.74  
However, this standard is deferential to state court decisions. The petitioner will not obtain 
relief under this standard unless no “‘fair minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the 
state court’s decision.”75 Even with this high “demanding” legal standard of review, the Seventh 
 
69 See id. ¶ 72 (Crooks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
70 826 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2016). 
71 See id. at 941-42. 
72 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018). A petitioner is also entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court when a 
state court decision on the defendant’s claim “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2) (2018).  
73 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). 
74 See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 
75 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
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Circuit held Imani was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the “Wisconsin Supreme Court 
decision was flatly contrary to Faretta and its progeny in three distinct ways.”76  
“First, the [Wisconsin Supreme Court] in effect required Imani to persuade the trial judge 
that he was making a knowing and voluntary decision to waive the right to counsel when it was 
actually the judge’s job to make sure that Imani’s waiver would be knowing and voluntary.”77 The 
Seventh Circuit noted the requirement that a defendant’s decision be knowing and intelligent “is 
not a condition that must be fulfilled before an accused may be ‘allowed’ to exercise his Sixth 
Amendment right to represent himself” but rather “a requirement for valid waiver of the right to 
counsel.”78 The state supreme court’s ratification of the circuit court’s inadequate colloquy after 
Imani invoked his constitutional right to represent himself was “flatly contrary to Faretta” because 
it had the impermissible effect of shifting the burden of demonstrating knowing and intelligent 
waiver of the right to counsel from the trial court to the defendant.79   
 “Second, the [Wisconsin Supreme Court] required Imani to persuade the trial judge that he 
had a good reason to choose self-representation. Under Faretta, however, a defendant’s reason for 
choosing to represent himself is immaterial.”80 The Seventh Circuit noted that the state supreme 
court held Imani did not make a “deliberate” decision to proceed alone, based on the circuit court’s 
determination that due to his purported emotional state of frustration, his decision lacked a 
“sufficiently rational basis.”81 However, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “denying a defendant 
his Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se because his choice is foolish or rash is also contrary 
 
76 Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 2016). 
77 Id. at 943-44. 
78 Id. at 944. 
79 Id. at 944-45. 
80 Id. at 944. 
81 See id. at 945 (citing State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶ 27, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40).  
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to Faretta” because “[n]othing in Faretta or its progeny allows the judge to require the defendant 
to prove he is making the choice for a reason the judge finds satisfactory.”82 
 “Third, the [Wisconsin Supreme Court] imposed a competence standard much more 
demanding than Faretta and its progeny allow, as if the issue were whether Imani was an 
experienced criminal defense lawyer.”83 The Seventh Circuit noted there were no material 
differences between Imani’s background and Faretta’s background.84 “Because Imani’s abilities 
were close enough to Faretta’s to be indistinguishable, the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied 
Faretta in denying Imani his right to represent himself.”85 
 Although the Seventh Circuit concluded the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision was 
contrary to Faretta and its progeny in three different ways, the state supreme court has yet to 
overrule Imani. Thus, Imani remains binding on Wisconsin courts,86 even though it rests on a 
crumbling legal foundation. As a result, whether a defendant’s decision to forgo counsel in 
Wisconsin is appropriately respected by a court may depend on whether the defendant is tried in 





82 Id. The court also noted that, as a practical matter, “[o]nly in rare cases will a trial judge view a defendant’s choice 
to represent himself as anything other than foolish or rash.” Id. 
83 Id. at 944. 
84 See id. at 946. 
85 Id. (footnote omitted). 
86 See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (“The supreme court is the only state court with 
the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previous supreme court decision.”); see also State v. King, 
205 Wis. 2d 81, 93, 555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that, with regard to federal court decisions, Wisconsin 
courts “are bound only by the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law”). 
87 Cf. Decker, supra note 8, at 516-17 (noting that as a result of lower courts not following a standardized practice in 
admonishing defendants about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, “the degree of protection afforded 
a defendant’s right to competent legal representation largely depends upon the courtroom in which they are 
prosecuted”). 
17
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B. The Curious Case of Terrance Egerson 
 
 In State v. Egerson,88 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the question of what 
constitutes a clear and unequivocal invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation 
in a criminal prosecution.89 Five months after Terrance Egerson was criminally charged, his 
counsel moved to withdraw from representation, citing “a disagreement over trial strategy.”90 
However, the circuit court denied the motion.91   
Two months later, Egerson explicitly requested for his attorney to move to withdraw as 
counsel.92 In the motion, Egerson’s counsel predicted his client would “likely” choose self-
representation “if the current representation is not withdrawn” because his client “has more faith 
in his own ability to represent himself than he does in his current representation.”93 At the hearing 
on the motion, Egerson’s counsel stated that the attorney-client relationship had been “irreparably 
destroyed” as a result of Egerson’s various actions, including: (1) speaking to the media, (2) 
preparing motions on his own behalf, and (3) accusing his counsel of colluding with the district 
attorney’s office to subvert his rights.94 Further, Egerson characterized his counsel as “totally 
deficient” and stated his communication with counsel had broken down.95   
 Ultimately, the circuit court granted the motion to withdraw.96 But, the court also 
admonished Egerson and referred to the allusions contained in the motion about self-
 
88 2018 WI App 49, 383 Wis. 2d 718, 916 N.W.2d 833, review denied, 2018 WI __. 
89 See id. ¶¶ 11-12. 
90 Id. ¶ 3. 
91 Id. 
92 See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49 (noting that the motion requesting 
permission for counsel to withdraw from the case stated it was done “on the request of Mr. Egerson”).  
93 Id. at 3-4. 
94 Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 4. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. ¶ 5. 
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representation. The court stated, “You’re heading down a slope, based on this record, where you’re 
going to find yourself . . . in a position where a court says you’re waiving your right to counsel 
and you’re going to be representing yourself, which would be the biggest mistake of your life.”97  
Later at the same hearing, as Egerson’s (former) counsel, the prosecutor, and the circuit 
court were “discussing the logistics of turning over discovery” to whomever would presumably 
become Egerson’s new appointed counsel, Egerson began discussing discovery that he believed 
had not been turned over by the prosecution to the defense.98 The circuit court suddenly cut off 
Egerson as he was speaking and informed him that he was not the counsel of record in the case.99 
Egerson then said, “Well, you know what. Your Honor, let me represent myself and have co-
counsel then.100 After the court curtly rejected his request, Egerson said, “Let me represent myself 
and have no counsel.”101 In response the court stated, “Better think about that one.”102 The hearing 
ended shortly afterward, with the court setting a date for future assignment of appointed counsel.103 
 Before new counsel was appointed for Egerson, he filed his own motion to dismiss one of 
the criminal charges against him.104 At the next hearing, the circuit court told the prosecutor and 
Egerson’s new appointed counsel about Egerson’s pro se motion, but the court decided to not 
address the substantive merits of the motion unless his new counsel decided to raise them.105 
Although Egerson made no more overtures towards self-representation,106 months before trial he 
 
97 Id.  





103 Id. ¶ 7. 
104 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49. 
105 Id. 
106 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 7 (“There was no further mention of Egerson proceeding pro se.”). 
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expressed dissatisfaction with his new counsel, and again asked that he be appointed new 
counsel.107  
After his trial and sentencing, Egerson filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial on the 
ground that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to self-representation.108 The circuit 
court denied his motion, reasoning that Egerson’s statements regarding self-representation at the 
hearing in question were “qualified, not unequivocal,” because they were made in the context of a 
conversation about discovery in the case and Egerson “was merely expressing dissatisfaction with 
his lawyer and trying to remedy what he believed his lawyer was not doing for him.”109 To buttress 
its decision, the circuit court also noted “[t]he fact that Egerson accepted new counsel and never 
requested to represent himself again.”110   
 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that 
Egerson’s statements at the hearing in question were not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to 
invoke the constitutional right to self-representation.111 First, relying primarily on State v. 
Darby,112 the court analogized Egerson’s statements to those made by the defendant in Darby and 
characterized Egerson’s statements as being “disgruntled with his attorney.”113 Second, the court 
distinguished the Seventh Circuit’s nonbinding decision in Imani v. Pollard,114 contending that 
while the Seventh Circuit “had implicitly determined that the right of self-representation had been 
 
107 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49. 
108 Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 9. 
109 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 9, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49. 
110 Id. at 10. 
111 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶¶ 1, 26-30. 
112 2009 WI App 50, 317 Wis. 2d 478, 766 N.W.2d 770. According to the Darby court, it faced what appeared to be a 
question of first impression in Wisconsin: what constitutes an invocation of the constitutional right to self-
representation? See id. ¶¶ 1, 14. However, one pre-Faretta case suggests Wisconsin courts may had already resolved 
this question by the early 1970s. See State v. Johnson, 50 Wis. 2d 280, 284, 184 N.W.2d 107 (1971) (stating that a 
defendant’s waiver of counsel “must be definite, unequivocal and unconditional”). But cf. Williams v. Bartlett, 44 
F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that “a defendant is not deemed to have equivocated in his desire for self-
representation merely because” the request is conditional). 
113 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 30. 
114 826 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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invoked,” it, in contrast, was explicitly addressing this threshold issue.115 Third, the court appeared 
to be concerned with Egerson’s emotional state when he requested self-representation.116   
 However, there are three fundamental flaws with the appellate decision. First, Darby does 
not support the court’s holding in Egerson. In Darby, the defendant sent the circuit court a letter 
complaining about a lack of communication with his counsel and a lack of access to the discovery 
materials; he also made an isolated reference in the letter to preparing for his case.117 Immediately 
preceding jury selection, the defendant again complained about his counsel and this time asked 
that his counsel be dismissed; also, he complained about not being able to access discovery 
materials, which prevented him from preparing for his case.118 
Due to the defendant merely expressing dissatisfaction with counsel, coupled with the 
defendant’s other isolated references to “preparing” for his case which were ambiguous about 
whether he was seeking self-representation, the defendant did not invoke the right to self-
representation.119 In contrast to Darby, Egerson’s statements at the hearing in question were not 
just general statements about how he was dissatisfied with counsel or that he wanted to “prepare” 
for his case; he specifically stated, “Let me represent myself and have no counsel.”120 If this does 
not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to self-representation, it is hard to imagine 
what would satisfy that standard.121            
 
115 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶¶ 25-26. 
116 See id. ¶¶ 12, 27-28, 30. 
117 Darby, 2009 WI App 50, ¶ 5. 
118 Id. ¶ 6. 
119 Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 25-27. 
120 Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 6. 
121 Cf. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 196-99 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (remanding case back to the circuit court to 
conduct a retrospective evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived the right to counsel after defendant sent a letter to the circuit court which said, “I would like to 
inform you that I will be acting on my own behalf in this case”).  
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Second, the appellate court did not satisfactorily distinguish the Seventh Circuit’s Imani 
decision. Although the Seventh Circuit may have assumed that Imani had unambiguously invoked 
his right to self-representation, it analyzed a related question addressed by the state supreme court: 
whether Imani’s invocation of the right to self-representation was “deliberate.”122 The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the state supreme court’s determination that Imani’s invocation of the right 
to self-representation was not deliberate (on the basis that it was purportedly rash or foolish) was 
contrary to Faretta; a defendant’s emotional state is not an appropriate basis in itself to deny his 
or her request to proceed without counsel.123 The state court of appeals appeared to ignore the 
larger concerns explicitly addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Imani by focusing on Egerson’s 
emotional state when he requested to represent himself.124  
Third, the state court of appeals ignored critical facts in the record when determining that 
Egerson’s statements were not a clear and unequivocal invocation of the constitutional right to 
self-representation—a notable oversight given the opinion’s repeated emphasis on the particular 
context of Egerson’s statements.125 While the court focused on Egerson’s purported emotional 
state when he requested to represent himself and the fact that he did not ask to represent himself 
again after the hearing in question,126 it conveniently left out the fact that Egerson filed a pro se 
motion after the hearing to dismiss one of the criminal charges against him.127 Additionally, the 
court downplayed the fact that: (1) at the hearing, it was the circuit court that initially brought up 
the subject of self-representation; and (2) after Egerson clearly requested to represent himself 
 
122 See Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2016). 
123 See id. at 945 & n.1; cf. State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶ 70, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40 (Crooks, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Here, even if Imani’s request was ‘flippant’ or ‘episodic-driven,’ it is not necessarily 
a non-deliberate choice. Rather, the language cited reflects the circuit court’s opinion that Imani was making a foolish 
choice by waiving counsel.”). 
124 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶¶ 12, 27-28, 30. 
125 See id. ¶¶ 12, 26-30. 
126 See id.  
127 Cf. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49. 
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without counsel, the circuit court responded, “Better think about that one.”128 The circuit court’s 
response alone indicates that Egerson’s request to represent himself was unequivocal.129                
Although the state court of appeals correctly noted whether a defendant’s constitutional 
right to self-representation has been violated is a question of law,130 the court could have taken one 
or two prudent steps. First, it could have concluded that it did need not address the issue of what 
the standard of review is regarding the determination of whether a defendant has clearly and 
unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation is a question of fact or, rather, a question of 
law, because the result would be the same under either standard of review.131 Second, based on the 
State’s concession, the court could have explicitly decided that for purposes of Egerson, this 
foundational issue is a question of law.132 Instead, the court did neither, further muddling 
Wisconsin’s already inconsistent Faretta jurisprudence.   
 After the appellate decision, Egerson filed a petition for review with the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, arguing that Egerson is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s (nonbinding) 
decision in Imani and that Wisconsin’s labyrinth of Faretta jurisprudence needs to be modified.133 
However, the state supreme court denied his petition for review. The state supreme court failed to 
take advantage of an opportunity to resolve inconsistencies and unanswered questions in its 
Faretta jurisprudence while ensuring defendants’ clear invocation of their constitutional right to 
self-representation in a criminal prosecution is scrupulously honored by trial courts. As a result, 
Wisconsin’s Faretta jurisprudence remains logically fragmented, no doubt increasing the 
likelihood of more fallacious reasoning in the future.   
 
128 Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 6. 
129 Cf. State v. Flanagan, 978 A.2d 64, 78 (Conn. 2009) (concluding that the substance of the trial court’s response to 
defendant’s request to proceed pro se indicated that the defendant’s request was unequivocal). 
130 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 10. 
131 Cf. State v. Towle, 35 A.3d 490, 493 (N.H. 2011). 
132 See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 8, Egerson, 2018 WI App 49. 
133 See Petition for Review of Defendant-Appellant at 24, 26-27, 29, Egerson, 2018 WI 49. 
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C. Are Wisconsin Courts Losing Sight of Defendant Autonomy? 
 
Faretta has been controversial since its inception. Yet, in its aftermath, even though the 
United States Supreme Court has at times expressed some doubts as to the foundational 
underpinnings of Faretta,134 the Court has recognized Faretta as embodying the value of defendant 
autonomy,135 invoking the Kantian ideal that each person, and criminal defendant, is an end in 
itself,136 and ultimately the master of one’s fate.137 Prior to Faretta, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
justified the right to self-representation under the Wisconsin Constitution, at least in part, on the 
value of defendant autonomy.138 
Wisconsin’s recent Faretta jurisprudence,139 however, like much of the jurisprudence from 
other jurisdictions,140 and even a large swatch of the academic literature on the Sixth Amendment 
 
134 See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 158 (2000) (noting that with 
the increased availability of competent counsel, many of the historical reasons for recognizing the right to self-
representation “do not have the same force”). 
135 See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 186-87 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he dignity at issue is the 
supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of individual 
choice.”); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178-179 (1984) (“The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity 
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best 
possible defense.”); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 571 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing “the unmistakable command of Faretta, which held that courts should not be in the business of 
paternalistically second-guessing the wisdom of a defendant’s desire to proceed pro se”); Erica J. Hashimoto, 
Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.C. L. Rev. 1147, 1154-55 (2010).  
136 See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 
(1992) (describing the concept of autonomy as “the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself 
[or herself], an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the 
like liberties of all others”). 
137 Cf. REBECCA NEWBERGER GOLDSTEIN, PLATO AT THE GOOGLEPLEX: WHY PHILOSOPHY WON’T GO AWAY 96 
(2014) (“[A]ll people have a stake in believing themselves masters of much of the domain of philosophy, most 
especially the questions of how life should be lived. To think oneself to be anything less than a master seems to 
diminish one’s very humanity.”); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE: WITH A PRELUDE IN GERMAN RHYMES 
AND AN APPENDIX OF SONGS 170 (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine Nauckhoff & Adrian Del Caro trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press reprt. 2008) (contending that people “want to be poets of [their] lives, starting with the smallest and most 
commonplace details”). 
138 Cf. Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511-11a, 129 N. W. 2d 175 (1964) (“[D]ue process also requires that 
throughout the criminal process the state must treat a defendant as a person possessing human dignity (after all it is 
the defendant who is going to suffer if he makes the wrong decision and forgoes a lawyer) and, in most instances, a 
defendant would be denied this treatment if counsel were imposed upon him against his wishes.”). 
139 Cf. Tatum v. Foster, 847 F.3d 459, 467 (7th Cir. 2017) (“This is the third time in recent months that we have had 
to consider a habeas corpus petition based on Faretta and the application of Wisconsin’s Klessig decision.”). 
140 See, e.g., Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 574 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (“While the majority pays nominal 
deference to the pro se right recognized in Faretta, the unmistakable subtext of its opinion is that the right is a nuisance 
and a constitutional anachronism that courts should curtail whenever possible.”); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 
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right to self-representation,141 reflects a distrust of both the motives and abilities of indigent 
defendants to represent themselves without the assistance of counsel. This institutional distrust of 
a defendant’s decision to engage in self-representation, whether explicit or implicit, has a 
deleterious effect on defendant autonomy.  
For example, the decisions in Imani and Egerson illustrate the tendency for courts to 
provide post ad hoc rationalizations for a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to exercise 
the right to self-representation.142 In Imani, after invoking his right to self-representation, the 
circuit court failed to conduct a full Klessig colloquy and then did not permit Imani to represent 
himself.143 On appeal, the state supreme court determined that the circuit court had engaged Imani 
on two of the Pickens factors and that the circuit court determined that Imani did not satisfy those 
two factors.144 However, the circuit court never stated it was addressing the Pickens factors, nor 
did it state that Imani had failed to satisfy those factors. Rather, the circuit court admonished 
Imani’s decision as “flippant” and “short-term,” and essentially required him to convince the 
circuit court he could proceed without counsel. Simply put, the state supreme court’s analysis of 
the circuit court’s decision was a post ad hoc rationalization. 
 
1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (asserting that “a defendant normally gives up more than he gains when he elects self-
representation”); People v. Marshall, 931 P.2d 262, 272 (Cal. 1997) (“We share the concern that some assertions of 
the right of self-representation may be a vehicle for manipulation and abuse.”); cf. German Lopez, This is the Most 
Obscene, Vulgar Court Transcript You’ll Ever See, VOX (Oct. 6, 2016, 12:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2016/10/6/13186708/judge-durham-rick-and-morty (posting video with “Rick & Morty” characters 
reenacting a trial court judge characterizing the constitutional right to self-representation to a criminal defendant as 
the “constitutional right to be a dumbass”). 
141 See, e.g., Decker, supra note 8, at 485 (“[W]hile some pro se defendants may not harbor a hidden motive behind 
the request, they are so totally out of touch with reality that they believe they can do it all themselves.” (footnote 
omitted)); cf. Hashimoto, supra note 135, at 1150 n.8 (“Most of the literature on the criminal defendant’s autonomy 
interest argues that any such interest should be limited.” (citations omitted)). 
142 Cf. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 566 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the majority provides a post hoc 
rationalization for the [trial] court’s denial of [the defendant’s] request for self-representation”); McAllister, supra 
note 50, at 1245-46 (noting how some appellate court “decisions reflect an overriding desire to affirm a defendant’s 
conviction,” which causes courts “to affirm the trial court’s ruling on the representation issue, regardless of the Sixth 
Amendment outcome”). 
143 State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶¶ 7-10, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40. 
144 See id. ¶ 3. 
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Likewise, in Egerson, after requesting to represent himself, the circuit court told Egerson, 
“Better think about that one.”145 Although the circuit court’s response alone suggests that 
Egerson’s request to represent himself was unambiguous,146 the state court of appeals nonetheless 
concluded that his request was equivocal on the basis that his statements were merely expressing 
his disgruntlement with his counsel.147 The court of appeals analysis, at best, was highly flawed.148 
In reality, the court of appeals’ analysis of the circuit court’s decision is indicative of a post ad hoc 
rationalization. 
The state supreme court in Imani reasoned that a defendant’s emotional state alone may 
render the defendant’s choice to proceed pro se as not deliberate.149 Additionally, the state court 
of appeals in Egerson appeared to treat Egerson’s emotional state when requesting to represent 
himself as relevant to whether his request was clear and unambiguous.150 In doing so, the 
Wisconsin appellate courts permitted their trial courts to substitute their own judgment as to what 
was best for those particular defendants. Instead, those appellate and trial courts forsook the 
Kantian ideal that each person is an end in itself and the master of his or her own fate by 
invalidating the legitimacy of those defendants’ requests to represent themselves based, at least in 
part, on the purported content of their emotional state. 
 
VI. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: IMANI REDUX? 
 
 Although Egerson failed to successfully find recourse in the Wisconsin state court system, 
he is not completely out of options. First, like Imani, he could find recourse in the federal court 
 
145 State v. Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 5, 383 Wis. 2d 718, 916 N.W.2d 833, review denied, 2018 WI __. 
146 Cf. State v. Towle, 35 A.3d 490, 493 (N.H. 2011). 
147 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 30. 
148 See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
150 See Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶¶ 12, 27-28, 30. 
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system. Further, he has plausible grounds to obtain a writ of habeas corpus—likely from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.   
 Similar to Imani, Egerson can argue the state court decision was contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of Faretta. The Egerson court, while not as explicit as the state supreme 
court in Imani, appeared to utilize the defendant’s emotional state, at least in part, to refuse the 
defendant’s request to proceed without counsel. In Imani, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a 
court may not deny a defendant’s invocation of the constitutional right to self-representation on 
the basis of the defendant’s emotional state; doing so is contrary to Faretta.151       
 Alternatively, Egerson could argue that the state court decision “was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”152 The Egerson court stated, “we find these facts to be more in line with those of 
Darby: a defendant who is disgruntled with his attorney and thus expresses an opinion that he 
could do a better job representing himself.”153 
But again, as a factual matter, Egerson did not merely express dissatisfaction with his 
counsel and say he could do a better a job. Rather, after the circuit court initially brought up the 
subject of self-representation at the hearing in question, he clearly asked to be allowed to represent 
himself, the clarity of which is evident from how the circuit court responded to his request. Then 
after the hearing, Egerson filed a pro se motion to dismiss one of the charges against him. The 
court of appeals ignored, or downplayed, these significant facts in its analysis. Under either of 
these arguments, it appears Egerson is plausibly entitled to habeas relief in federal court.   
 
 
151 See Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Tatum v. Foster, 847 F.3d 459, 467 (7th Cir. 
2017) (“Although this court’s decisions are not authoritative for purposes of AEDPA, they can present useful 
examples.”). 
152 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2018). 
153 Egerson, 2018 WI App 49, ¶ 30. 
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CONCLUSION   
 
With its decision to deny Egerson’s petition for review, Wisconsin’s Faretta jurisprudence 
remains a dangerous labyrinth for practitioners and judges alike to traverse. Nonetheless, Egerson 
has plausible grounds for obtaining habeas relief in federal court. Whether or not those grounds 
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